

10-1048

12 FEB 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DD/I (Planning)

SUBJECT : Intelligence Communications

1. We have read the comprehensive study "Intelligence Communications and Related Procedures" which came attached to your 23 January 1958 memorandum, subject as above, in connection with the approved draft of NSCID 7, "Critical Intelligence Communications " and while noting that although our primary task will be to identify critical intelligence communications, we readily agree with you that the whole question has many ramifications; so hasten to add a few of our own. The problems which must be faced and solved before we can arrive at a system as complete and integrated as that which you have described, which will really serve intelligence, are numerous. One of the most important considerations, it seems to us, lies in the fact that a clear separation can not be made between intelligence information and operational information. For example, a large percentage of the information received by the intelligence community from the Department of State is primarily operational in nature and is so considered by the Department of State. The same is also true of some of the communications received by DD/P. It is important, therefore, that no purely intelligence communication system be created which does not take into consideration the intelligence value of operational messages. In some respects, perhaps what is really required is an integration of all means by which messages concerning foreign developments can be processed through the interested agencies and departments regardless of whether such messages are called "intelligence" or "operational". We look forward to discussing these and other points with you in the near future.

2. With respect to the information requested in paragraph 3 of your memorandum the following is submitted. There is great variation amongst the Divisions of OSI as to the speed with which intelligence information is required. The Nuclear Energy Division and the Guided Missiles Division have an obvious and immediate need to receive certain types of information almost at the moment an event occurs. At the other extreme is the Fundamental Sciences Division which, working on a more long range basis is reasonably

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well serviced by present mechanisms. Taking OSI as a whole, however, we estimate the following:

- a. Ten percent (10%) of the current information should be received within a matter of minutes or hours after the event. This category includes certain information from NSA and data collected by technical surveillance systems (i.e., seismic, acoustic and similar systems), a few CS reports and rare items from other agencies.
- b. Twenty-five percent (25%) should be received within 24 hours after the event. Included in this category are information from NSA, CS reports, and critical items from State, Army, Navy and Air Force.
- c. The remaining sixty-five percent (65%) of information is less affected by the time factor and could continue to be transmitted as at present. This category includes the bulk of "attache" reports, many CS reports, and the reports

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Deputy Assistant Director/Collection
Office of Scientific Intelligence

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